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I am pleased to have this opportunity to celebrate the career of Hans-Martin Sass 
who has been my colleague at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown 
University for over 35 years. He has had a remarkable career simultaneously the 
founder of the important German Center for Medical Ethics at Ruhr University in 
Bochum, Germany, and Senior Research Fellow at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, 
Georgetown University, in Washington, DC. Reflecting a truly remarkable 
international career he has also been on the faculty of Peking Union Medical 
College in China and is a former member of the UNESCO International Bioethics 
Committee—the group having the strongest claim to legitimately articulating the 
bioethics standards for the world.
Professor Sass’s contributions have covered the fields of philosophy and bioethics 
including Continental philosophy (Hegel, Marx, Heidegger) (Sass, 1967, 1982, 
and1983), global bioethics (Sass, 1989b; Sass and Xioamei, 2011; Muzur and Sass, 
2012), stem cells (Sass, 2006), genetics (Sass, 2004), brain life and brain death (Sass, 
1989a), organ transplantation (Sass, 1998), advance directives (Kielstein and Sass, 
1993), and surrogate decision-making (Sass, Veatch, and Kimura, 1998).
It is in the areas of organ transplantation, advance directives, and surrogate decision-
making that I have had my closest and most sustained interaction with him and in 
which I would like to address some additional remarks. During the 1990s Dr. Sass 
and I along with Japanese lawyer-philosopher, Rihito Kimura, undertook a major 
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cross-cultural project on advance directives and surrogate decision-making focusing 
primarily on Germany, the United States, and Japan. We were interested in the 
emergence of clinical, legal, and ethical aspects of end-of-life decision-making, the 
interplay among patients, their surrogates, and their clinicians in making decisions 
to forgo life-sustaining treatment, and the emergence of varying definitions of death 
that are influential in organ procurement. 
We created nine research teams studying these three aspects in the three different 
cultures. Meetings were held in all three countries to conduct the research. We saw 
that the cultural orientations of the three countries led to significantly different 
tendencies—heavy emphasis on individualism and autonomy-based self-
determination in the United States, deep commitment to family involvement in 
Japan, and an intermediate set of patterns in Germany showing increasing opening 
to patient self-determination, but retaining some level of traditional physician 
paternalism in decision-making.
The overall conclusion of this project and of much of the work of the three of us 
was a support of the role of the patient as the one who has a legitimate claim to 
control of terminal illness decisions. The mechanisms of advance directives and 
surrogate judgment have generally been supported by us and, while we acknowledge 
the possibility of “pro-treatment” advance directives, the typical role for the 
directives has been to facilitate treatment refusal thus permitting the dying process 
to progress uninterrupted.
The Discovery of a Conflict Between Advance Directives and 
Organ Donation
The new development that I want to add in this brief comment is an increasing 
awareness of the complex and potentially controversial interplay between the 
patient’s wishes expressed in an advance directive and that patient’s desires regarding 
pre- and post-mortem organ donation. It is my concern that advance directives, 
faithfully followed by clinicians in the manner endorsed in our work of the 1990s, 
can end up thwarting the patient’s organ donation desires.
Typically, patients writing advance directives or otherwise expressing wishes about 
terminal care that can be acted upon in substituted judgment by surrogates express 
a desire to refuse life-sustaining treatments in order to let the dying process 
continue. They fear the tyranny of clinicians who, for whatever reason, feel it is their 
duty to preserve life as long as possible. Over the period starting in the 1970s and 
continuing to this day, bioethicists, lawyers, and patients’ rights advocates have won 
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battle after battle leading to policies that prohibit physicians from treating against 
patient wishes expressed in advance directives or otherwise communicated to 
surrogates.
In the United States physicians have increasingly gotten the message that they 
should follow the patient’s wishes and do not have the right to substitute their own 
judgment about what is appropriate treatment. Often this is expressed as a resistance 
physicians second-guessing what is written in the patient’s directive. The message is 
that the physician should simply follow the literal expressed wishes of the patient 
and avoid attempts to second-guess or reinterpret the directive in a way that 
circumvents the clear, literal position taken by the patient in a written directive.
Here is the newly discovered problem: Most patients who write anti-treatment 
advance directives or otherwise express anti-treatment desires, are also sympathetic 
to organ donation. If asked they would, in high percentages, express a preference for 
having their organs procured following their deaths if there is any chance they can 
be of any use in transplant, other therapy, research, or even education. Let’s consider 
this a “modal” position of patients today.
The problem with his modal situation is that, although patients (and many health 
professionals) do not realize it, the chance of the patient’s organs being useful can 
often be increased if certain medical interventions occur when the patient is in the 
dying process, that is, prior to the death of the patient. Sometimes these 
interventions can impact the dying trajectory, perhaps increasing the time it takes to 
die. For example, in order for organs to be preserved with maximum benefit, 
patients may need to be ventilated to maintain oxygen levels. Sometimes heparin 
(an anticoagulant) may be given. This can, in rare instances, influence the events in 
the dying process, sometimes preserving life, sometimes hastening it. Antibiotics or 
fluids may be given. All of these may extend life temporarily. But if the patient has 
an anti-treatment advance directive that is to be taken literally, these are forbidden. 
They would be considered unethical by anyone who has come to believe that the 
patient’s wishes as expressed in an advance directive or in oral communication to 
surrogates should prevail. These interventions to increase the chance of obtaining 
usable, high-quality organs may well be illegal in a jurisdiction that has fought many 
hard-won battles to prohibit physicians from administering life-extending 
interventions contrary to the patient’s expressed advance directive.
Of course, patients who write anti-treatment advance directives did not have this 
situation in mind when they signed their treatment refusing documents. 
Overwhelmingly people who have written anti-treatment advance directives will, if 
asked, acknowledge that, of course, they would desire interventions to increase the 
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likelihood of obtaining usable organs after they die. At least if the intervention 
merely briefly prolongs life and imposes little or no burden on the patient, the 
overwhelming majority of patients who have written anti-treatment advance 
directives would say they would want these treatments in spite of the fact that they 
extended life a bit.
As we become more and more successful in convincing health professionals, judges, 
and the general citizenry that patient advance directives should be followed without 
attempts to second-guess the meaning of the words in the documents, patients who 
would like their deaths include a contribution to their fellow humans are in more 
and more jeopardy of having their desires circumvented.
A Potential Resolution of the Conflict
The solution to this problem is two-pronged, an easy part and a hard part. 
An Amendment to an Advance Directive
First the easy part. For those who have written anti-treatment advance directives 
that typically demand the forgoing of life-support at a point when death is 
imminent and inevitable, an amendment is urgently needed to their documents. 
This amendment should make clear that, although they generally do not want their 
lives extended for their own benefit, they are open to, in fact insist upon, 
interventions to improve the chance of obtaining useful organs and preserving the 
quality of those organs, even though this could change the dying trajectory, 
potentially extending life briefly.
The amendment needs to consider two potential complications. First, it is possible, 
at least in theory, that, even though this is not intended, the intervention could 
actually shorten the dying trajectory. For example, giving heparin could cause a 
cranial bleed (hemorrhagic stroke) that causes a more immediate death. Although 
this is unlikely, its possibility needs to be confronted. Most moral philosophers and 
theologians who have considered this possibility treat this as a “double effect” or 
“indirect effect” of the therapy. A significant number of people—probably a 
majority—continue to find it morally unacceptable to intentionally cause the death 
of a patient by actively intervening. Many, however, distinguish this from cases in 
which the death is actively caused by an intervention that is not undertaken for the 
purpose of causing the death even though death may be known to be a potential 
side effect risk.
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The policy that copes with this set of circumstances is often referred to as the 
“doctrine of double effect.” Traditional Roman Catholic scholars accept the risk of 
killing as a side effect of administering high-dose narcotic analgesia, removing a 
cancerous uterus from a woman pregnant with a pre-viable fetus, and many other 
such examples (Foot, 1967; Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 
1980, Pellegrino, 1995). Secular commentators in some cases also endorse the 
doctrine (President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1983; Marquis, 1991).
There is no reason why this doctrine would not apply to cases involving the 
administration of treatments that, hypothetically, could shorten a dying patient’s life 
as long as the intention was to preserve organs and not to shorten the life. It seems 
reasonable that anyone who stands in the long tradition of applying double effect 
doctrine to cases of intervention regarding dying patients would accept this logic 
and support organ-preserving efforts even if they pose a risk of shortening life.
The second complication to a proposal to amend anti-treatment advance directives 
to include a provision that authorizes interventions to preserve organs even if they 
may change the patient’s dying trajectory is that, in theory, these interventions could 
cause the patient pain or suffering. They could prolong consciousness and thus 
extend the psychological trauma for the dying patient, or they could even inflict 
significant pain. Thus, an amending paragraph to provide an exception to the 
general refusal of treatment for the purpose of preserving organs should include a 
mechanism to recognize a reasonable limit on the organ-preserving intervention if it 
will burden the dying patient significantly.
I have worried about these problems for many years and have drafted an amending 
paragraph for my personal advance directive to cope with my desire to be an organ 
donor and to avoid jeopardizing organs by my instruction to forgo life-support. 
That paragraph reads as follows:
Let it be known that I expressly desire any medical procedures, 
including those that are life-prolonging, that shall be necessary in 
order to make organ or tissue procurement more effective unless the 
person named in the preceding sentence considers these procedures 
too burdensome for me.
This paragraph is preceded by the naming of a person, who is also designated as my 
surrogate for interpreting any other provisions in my advance directive.
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The Use of Surrogates to Override Advance Directives
The second part of the solution to the conflict between advance directives and the 
desire to be an organ donor is more complex. The vast majority of people today who 
have written an advance directive have not had a chance to think about the conflict 
between these two desires yet would agree with the provision that organ-preserving 
interventions should be an exception to the anti-treatment advance directive. Those 
who have not written an advance directive and therefore rely on the substituted 
judgment of a surrogate for making terminal illness treatment decisions are in a 
similar situation. They may have expressed orally while competent their desire not 
to have life support in the event of a terminal illness and rely on their surrogate to 
execute that decision. Typically, when they have expressed these views they have not 
thought about whether they would want an exception for temporary intervention to 
preserve organs even though it might change the dying trajectory. Even though they 
have not thought about it, it seems likely that most people writing anti-treatment 
advance directives would, in fact, want the exception clause.
There is evidence that people differ significantly on the extent to which they want 
their advance directives followed closely (Sehgal, Galbraith, Chesney, Schoenfeld, et 
al, 1992). Nevertheless, some policy must be adopted. Of course, the best would be 
if people, when writing their advance directives, also included a provision indicating 
how closely they wanted them followed and, who should have the authority to 
interpret and, if it appears necessary, to override.
Some might assume that the physician is the one who should have this discretion. 
On reflection, however, that seems to be a mistaken approach. It was because of 
persistent physician error in judging what patients wanted that we developed 
policies for advance directives in the first place. There is no reason to assume that 
the one who is an expert on the medical facts of a case is also an expert on the value 
judgments about what should be the best therapeutic choices. I have argued that 
physicians cannot be expected to know what is best for patients. Even if they are in 
the best position to know the medical facts, they typically are not the ones who 
know the patient’s values the best (Veatch, 2009 and 2015).
Good advance directives should include a specification of who the patient would 
like to function as a surrogate—often, but not always, a spouse, significant other, or 
adult family member. The default policy that is emerging as the best option is, if 
there is no surrogate named, it should be the next of kin unless a court has 
designated someone else. The valid surrogate should be the one who has the 
authority to interpret the advance directive, make a judgment about how literally 
the patient would want the directive followed, and when an exception should be 
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made to the treatment acceptance or refusal choice in the directive. It seems 
plausible that some surrogates would conclude that the one for whom they are 
exercising surrogacy would want an exception made to the refusal of interventions 
that are likely to change the dying trajectory when making the exception would 
make organ recovery possible with little or no burden on the patient.
The issue regarding exceptions to advance directives is directly analogous to the 
problem regarding economic wills. If some writes a valid document, we should 
normally presume that it should be followed. Only in very exceptional circumstances 
should the will be overturned. I suggest the same approach to the problem of 
making an exception to advance directive instructions in order to administer 
treatments for the purpose of preserving the organ donation option and maximizing 
the quality of those organs.
Imminent Death Donation
While contemplating an amendment to one’s advance directive for the purpose of 
facilitating organ procurement, there is a related issue that one might wish to 
consider. Most people find the donation of a single kidney while the donor is alive 
to be a noble and morally praiseworthy decision. We have begun to contemplate a 
special circumstance of living kidney donation in the case of a terminally ill patient 
dependent on life-supporting technologies such as a ventilator. If a decision has 
been made based on an advance directive or surrogate decision-making to forgo life 
support and let the dying process continue, it is sometimes technically possible to 
procure a kidney prior to stopping the life-support. This would be a special case of 
living kidney donation, special in the sense that the patient will be spared the pain 
and suffering of the procurement and will avoid any residual risk of continuing to 
live with only one kidney (Morrissey, 2012).
This has come to be called “imminent death donation.” In the United States we are 
close to adopting policies that permit donation of a single kidney prior to stopping 
of life-support. This would not necessarily be incompatible with a standard anti-
treatment advance directive, but, in a manner similar to what we have been 
discussing, the intervention to procure a kidney prior to forgoing life-support could 
require treatments (ventilation, etc.) that would change the dying trajectory, thus 
raising the problem we have been considering. For someone who is sympathetic to 
imminent death donation, the amendment to an advance directive should also 
include a provision that one would want organs obtained prior to death, if possible, 
provided there was not a significant added burden to the patient.
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For the current time, most discussion of imminent death donation is restricted to a 
single kidney (using standard living kidney donation as a model). Some of us have 
begun to consider that additional organs might justifiably be procured at this time 
as well. The moral rationale for standard living kidney donation is that it imposes a 
tolerable burden on the donor and only a minor risk of unintentional loss of life. 
That same rationale supports donation of a single kidney as a first step in the process 
of forgoing life-support and it supports it even more strongly since both pain and 
suffering and mortality risk are essentially eliminated. That being the case, it is 
provocative to ask why the same rationale would not support procurement of the 
second kidney. The patient would not die from kidney failure provided a decision 
has been made to forgoing life-support. In fact, other organs—liver and pancreas—
for example could also be procured based on the same rationale. The removal of any 
of these organs would not be the cause of death (although that cannot be said for 
procurement of thoracic organs—heart and lungs).
I suggest the following sentence:
Let it also be known that, if this directive is acted upon, I desire at the 
time to be a living organ donor. I would like a kidney [or all organs 
that the procurement team is willing to take] procured prior to 
forgoing life-support and consent to the procurement as well as any 
medical treatments that will facilitate that procurement provided my 
surrogate does not consider such treatment too burdensome for me.
Conclusion
I put forward these suggestions in the belief that Hans-Martin Sass and others who 
have contributed so much to the development of advance directives would find 
them compatible with the work done in previous decades that furthers the respect 
owed to patients who have developed moral positions about their terminal care. It is 
striking that all those decades of work left us with model advance directives that 
were oblivious to the possibility that following the literal words of a directive could 
end up circumventing the writer’s desire not only to have a meaningful and dignified 
death but also to benefit others through organ donation, especially when doing so 
would come at no burden to the writer. Some people may not wish to facilitate 
organ donation and that is their right, but the many who do should take care that 
their written directives do not jeopardize that opportunity.
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